The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances by Hopster, Jeroen
  
Animals 2019, 9, 1054; doi:10.3390/ani9121054 www.mdpi.com/journal/animals 
Article 
The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and 
Empirical Advances 
Jeroen Hopster 
Institut für Philosophie, University of Graz, Heinrichstrasse 26/V, 8010 Graz, Austria;  
jeroen.hopster@uni-graz.at 
Received: 27 September 2019; Accepted: 15 November 2019; Published: 1 December 2019 
Simple Summary: An influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members 
of one’s own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled ‘speciesism’, in analogy with 
racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, 
the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter 
Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a 
stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I 
argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research 
avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical 
intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue 
‘Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy’. 
Abstract: This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the 
speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) 
as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral 
intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual 
progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view 
that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant (‘species-relativism’). 
Third, if we adopt Singer’s definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it 
is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions—the 
Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests—is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals 
are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for 
integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the 
interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any 
dissimilarities might be morally relevant.  
Keywords: speciesism; intuition; evolutionary debunking arguments; moral psychology; species-
relativism; cumulative culture; Peter Singer; Shelly Kagan; Bernard Williams 
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“Our inclination to treat humans as though we are special is no mere prejudice. Despite what Singer 
says, there is a significant philosophical view at work here—one worthy of careful further 
investigation.” Shelly Kagan [1] (p. 20) 
“At the end of the day, no clear consensus has emerged—or, at best, this one: no rejoinder to Singer’s 
attack on speciesism has convinced many besides its author, and the challenge remains.” François 
Jacquet [2] (p. 2) 
1. Introduction 
Half a century after the term ‘speciesism’ was coined, the question of whether human beings 
have an elevated moral status is still a topic of live debate in animal ethics (Appendix A, 1). 
Commonly taken as a starting point of this debate is Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, where Singer 
characterizes speciesism as a widespread “prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of 
members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” [3] (p. 6). Singer 
regards speciesism as discrimination on the basis of species membership, on a par with sexism and 
racism: speciesists unjustifiably favour the interests of members of their own group over the interests 
of others. 
Singer’s [3–5] position regarding speciesism has remained essentially unchanged over the 
decades, but meanwhile, some prominent ethicists have stood up to challenge his view. For instance, 
Bernard Williams [6] has argued that ‘being a human’ is itself a morally relevant property, and that 
a prejudice in favour of human beings can be defended accordingly. More recently, Shelly Kagan [1] 
has entertained the possibility (without wholeheartedly endorsing it) that a version of ‘personism’ is 
morally defensible, arguing that either personism should be regarded as a speciesist view, or most 
people are not speciesists, pace Singer (Appendix A, 2). But new arguments in support of Singer’s 
position have been articulated too, such as François Jacquet’s [2] Evolutionary Debunking Argument 
against speciesism, on the basis of findings from experimental moral psychology. 
The speciesism debate has several dimensions, and the aforementioned authors are by no means 
the only voices in the debate. But, in what follows, my discussion will give specific attention to their 
contributions, as they provide a good impression of the state-of-the-art as well as some of its 
limitations. My aim will be to articulate certain correctives to the debate and to provide suggestions 
that can help to advance it. For instance, Kagan’s [1] discussion might leave the impression that the 
speciesism debate has essentially reached a stalemate since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable 
moral intuitions. This impression is misleading, I will argue, and merits to be corrected. One avenue 
that can help to reinvigorate the debate is research on the origins and justification of moral 
intuitions—and preliminary findings give reason to believe that on the topic of speciesism, not all 
ethical intuitions should be given equal weight. 
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce Singer’s view of speciesism and 
highlight the core ethical principle on which it relies: the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. I 
defend the principle from Kagan’s recent criticism, specifically from his suggestion that speciesists 
can simply counter it by appealing to countervailing intuitions. As I underscore in Section 3, not all 
moral intuitions are created equal: appeals to moral intuition are not warranted if they can be 
undercut by so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs). Although further research is 
called for, preliminary findings from moral psychology suggest that at least some speciesist intuitions 
are proper targets of EDAs. In Section 4, I go on to argue that while empirical research—specifically, 
research on the question of whether ‘the folk’ endorses speciesism—can help to advance the ethical 
debate, such research faces various challenges and pitfalls that researchers have to overcome. In 
Section 5, I return to Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, pointing out that it may 
potentially be of limited scope: if the interests of animals are different in kind, then it is not 
straightforward what giving these interests equal consideration amounts to. In Section 6, I argue that 
a failure to appreciate this point, might lead to the conflation of two debates: the debate of whether 
there exists a moral hierarchy between members of different species (i.e., the speciesism debate) and 
the debate of whether there are morally relevant differences between the interests of different animals. 
Building especially on the latter debate, in Section 7, I raise the question of whether there are morally 
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relevant differences between the interests of humans and non-human animals. More specifically, I 
entertain the proposal—which should be subject to further empirical and normative scrutiny—that 
the culturally scaffolded lives humans lead have a transformative effect on human interests, in the 
sense that these interests typically (though not always) differ in kind from the interests of non-human 
animals. In conclusion, I address a common thread running through my discussion: while both 
further philosophical analysis and further empirical studies can help to advance the speciesism 
debate, key advances rely on the interplay between them. 
2. Singer’s Anti-Speciesist Position: A Defence  
There are various definitions of speciesism in circulation in the academic literature (contrast 
[1,2,7]) and beyond. Some authors treat speciesism as an unjustified position by definition [8]. This is 
problematic, however, since the defensibility of speciesism is subject to substantive debate [9]. A more 
fruitful approach is to distinguish the descriptive concept of speciesism from its normative 
evaluation. Here, and in what follows, I will adopt Singer’s [3] definition, according to which 
speciesism involves the preferential consideration of the interests of members of one’s own species (Appendix 
A, 3).  
In this section I outline Singer’s normative argument against speciesism and defend it from a 
recent criticism by Kagan [1]. Singer’s argument departs from the ethical premise that if the interests 
of beings are alike, then they should be given equal consideration. For example, if two beings suffer 
from famine, then their respective interests in avoiding such suffering should weigh equally in our 
moral decision-making. Importantly, equal consideration need not amount to equal treatment. Members 
of different species have different needs and preferences, and as a result differential treatment is often 
warranted. Obviously, alleviating famine calls for different kinds of treatment, depending on the 
dietary needs of the starving animal in question. However, and this is Singer’s key point, while 
differential treatment of animals may be warranted, preferential consideration on the basis of species-
membership is not. If interests are alike, then it amounts to bias to give preferential consideration to 
the interests of members one’s own species. Any additional properties that members of the human 
species might have are morally irrelevant, if the interests of human and non-human animals are alike, 
Singer argues: 
“Can they suffer? Can they enjoy life? If so, they have interests that we should take into account, 
and we should give those interests equal weight with the interests of all other beings with similar 
interests. We should not discount their interests in not suffering because they cannot talk or because 
they are incapable of reasoning; and we should not discount their interests in enjoying life, in having 
things that are fulfilling and rewarding for them, either. The principle of equal consideration of 
interests should apply to both humans and animals. That’s the sense in which I want to elevate 
animals to the moral status of humans.” [4] (p. 575) 
To recapitulate, the core ethical principle underlying Singer’s anti-speciesist position can be 
spelled out as follows. 
• Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: We must give equal weight to like interests  
We have good grounds for endorsing the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests as a weighty 
ethical principle since it embellishes moral values that many people hold in high regard: fairness and 
non-discrimination. Indeed, it is the same principle that underlies ethical condemnation of racism 
and sexism. Singer regards these attitudes as homologous: if we submit that racism and sexism are 
morally wrong, then by the same token, we should submit that speciesism is wrong. 
Although Singer does not employ the term, we can understand his analogy between speciesism 
on the one hand and racism and sexism on the other, as an application of consistency reasoning [10]. 
The basic idea of consistency reasoning is that like cases should be treated alike. If cases are not 
treated alike, then there should be a morally relevant difference between them. Ethical reasoning 
typically proceeds in this manner, and justifiably so: consistency reasoning seems to be an 
appropriate method for reasoning with moral cases [11].  
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Accordingly, disagreement in ethics typically amounts to disagreement over which properties 
should be regarded as morally relevant. Such disagreement also exists in the speciesism debate. 
Contra Singer, some authors maintain that there is a morally relevant difference between preferential 
consideration on the basis of race or sex and on the basis of species membership (Appendix A, 4). For 
instance, Kagan [1] (p. 8) argues that while in the contexts of racism or sexism preferential 
consideration is based on false empirical claims, in the context of speciesism it is based on a justifiable 
appeal to moral intuition. One way to spell out this intuition, Kagan proposes, is to argue that the 
‘ownership’ of a given experience is a morally relevant property [1] (p. 5). For example, when 
considering the interest in ‘not experiencing pain’, one might regard it as morally relevant who 
experiences pain. If ownership of pain makes a morally relevant difference, then the pain of human and 
non-human animals need not be regarded as being of equal moral weight. Accordingly, speciesists 
may find the following principle intuitively plausible.  
• Principle of Morally Relevant Ownership: It is morally relevant whether or not an interest 
belongs to a human  
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that this principle adequately captures speciesists’ 
intuitions. The principle entails that the interests of a human and non-human animal in ‘not 
experiencing pain’ should not be given equal consideration. Hence, the principle is incompatible with 
Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. Which of these two principles to adopt? Kagan 
submits that Singer offers no argument to debunk a speciesist principle along these lines; he merely 
relies on an appeal to his own countervailing principle. This appeal, however, is ultimately grounded 
in intuition, Kagan argues, just like the speciesist’s appeal to the Principle of Morally Relevant 
Ownership is. There seem to be no further grounds for favouring Singer’s anti-speciesist intuition over 
the speciesist’s intuition. Hence, Kagan’s diagnosis leaves the impression that we are faced with a 
clash of moral intuitions, leading to a stand-off in the speciesism debate. 
In the remainder of this section, as well as the next one, I will argue that this impression is 
misleading: even if speciesist and anti-speciesist positions ultimately rest on irreconcilable intuitions 
about which properties count as morally relevant, it would be a mistake to think that these intuitions 
should necessarily be given equal weight. One reason why this is a mistake, I will argue in Section 3, 
has to do with the different epistemic statuses of intuitions: if we know that a given moral intuition 
comes about through a process that typically gives rise to cognitive biases, then this detracts from the 
plausibility of the intuition. Moreover, while further research is called for, there is preliminary 
experimental evidence that at least some speciesist intuitions indeed come about through processes 
typically associated with cognitive biases [2,7] (Appendix A, 5). 
But with regard to the apparent stand-off between Singer and the speciesist view imagined by 
Kagan, there are also straightforward ethical considerations that can help to adjudicate the debate. 
Consider which of the principles each party advances is better supported by well-established moral 
values and principles. As noted, Singer’s principle is plausible on ethical grounds since it embellishes 
the values of fairness and non-discrimination. By contrast, it is far from obvious that Kagan’s 
principle gets much support from our moral background knowledge. The principle embellishes the 
values of partiality and favouritism, which we typically disvalue from an ethical point of view. 
Moreover, Kagan does not clarify why a racist or sexist could not advance a similar principle, arguing, 
say, that it is morally relevant whether or not a given experience is ‘owned’ by a white man. The 
unwelcome association with sexism and racism (cf. [5]), combined with the fact that Kagan’s principle 
seems to lack positive support from our moral background knowledge, gives us good reason to 
discard it and endorse Singer’s principle instead.  
3. Speciesist Intuitions and Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
On Kagan’s analysis, conflicting moral intuitions play a key role in the speciesism debate. 
Consider once more Kagan’s argument for taking seriously the speciesist view that ownership of pain 
is morally relevant. While Kagan himself does not wholeheartedly endorse this view, he does regard 
it as a moral intuition that should be taken seriously:  
Animals 2019, 9, 1054 5 of 14 
“Admittedly, I have offered no argument for [this] speciesist view. Perhaps the claim that human 
suffering counts more is simply an intuition that some people have, nothing more. But even if so, 
that hardly shows there is anything wrong with the view.” [1] (p. 6) 
Indeed, Kagan maintains that speciesists are entitled to rely on the strongly held intuition that 
ownership of pain is morally relevant, even without giving this intuition much argumentative 
support, because Singer similarly relies on a moral intuition when suggesting that morally relevant 
interests are grounded in sentience:  
“[O]ne would be hard pressed to think of anything other than intuition to support the claim that the 
line between sentience and nonsentience is a morally significant one. So Singer himself is going to 
have to admit that the appeal to intuition carries force in questions like these. And once he has done 
that, it seems he should admit that it is just as legitimate for the speciesist to appeal to her intuition 
that the line between humans and animals is also a morally significant one, in which case speciesism 
is no more a mere prejudice than sentientism!” [1] (p. 7) 
But do these intuitions have similar argumentative standing, as Kagan suggests? Findings from 
cognitive psychology indicate that our intuitions on some topics are hardly reliable [12]. In the field 
of ethics, too, the reliability of intuitions has recently become a topic of debate, specifically in the 
context of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments. Roughly speaking, EDAs are arguments that aim to 
show that the causal explanation (e.g., the evolutionary aetiology) of a normative belief detracts from 
the belief’s justification. Applied to moral intuitions, EDAs typically purport to show that the causal 
origins of intuitions make them unreliable. Drawing on Kahane’s [13] (p. 106) discussion, they have 
the following structure: 
(1) Our moral intuition that P is explained by X. 
(2) X is an off-track process (i.e., a process that is not conducive towards tracking P’s truth). 
(3) Therefore, our moral intuition that P is unjustified. 
EDAs hold a promise to revitalise existing ethical debates, especially debates that appear to have 
turned into deadlocks between conflicting moral intuitions [2]. Instead of discrediting some moral 
intuitions by appealing to other, more plausible moral intuitions, as in the discussion at the end of 
Section 2, EDAs can be invoked to scrutinize the tenability of moral intuitions on external grounds—
i.e., in terms of their epistemic reliability. By way of example, consider Kelly’s [14] dismissal of moral 
intuitions, which are triggered by feelings of disgust. The mechanisms at the heart of the 
psychological disgust system originally evolved to protect us from harmful food and parasites. 
Feelings of disgust were later co-opted in our moral psychology. But arguably, these feelings are not 
well-attuned to the moral domain: they are sensitive to influences that tend to lead our moral 
judgements off-track. If this is correct, then moral intuitions that are triggered by a disgust response 
should be regarded as generally unreliable. 
Now consider once again Kagan’s appeal to speciesist intuitions. Giving speciesist intuitions 
presumptive weight is justified, Kagan argues, because these intuitions are widely held; moreover, 
Singer’s anti-speciesist intuitions are given presumptive weight just as well. But this argument can 
only be sustained if the widely held intuitions Kagan appeals to are not ‘off-track’, and equally 
reliable as Singer’s intuitions. It is not obvious that this is the case: in fact, there are reasons to think 
that untutored speciesist intuitions are a particularly promising target for EDAs. This is because 
speciesist intuitions, just like racist and sexist intuitions (which are common targets of EDAs in 
applied ethics), are self-serving: having such intuitions typically benefits the individual having them, 
irrespective of their truth or justification. Indeed, preliminary evidence from psychology suggests 
that similar mechanisms underlie both speciesism and other forms of prejudice: there is a positive 
correlation between speciesism and prejudicial attitudes such as racism, sexism, and homophobia [7]. 
Examining the potential of EDAs is a promising avenue for further research on the topic of 
speciesism. Other preliminary findings on this topic come from Jacquet, who presents evidence that 
what he dubs “the speciesist belief” results from the cognitive dissonance of meat-eaters, and who 
argues that these origins detract from the belief’s reliability [2]. This is an interesting claim, and 
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Jacquet’s combined normative and experimental approach provides a good example of how inquiry 
on these matters can proceed. But more work remains to be done. As I will discuss in Section 6, 
unfortunately, Jacquet operationalizes “the speciesist belief” with a definition that diverges from 
Singer’s. As a result, his argument does not speak directly to the debate between speciesists and anti-
speciesists in Singer’s sense. Moreover, the success of Jacquet’s EDA hinges on the question of the 
extent to which eating meat is the principal reason for why people endorse speciesism. Jacquet’s 
findings do not settle this question; while the “meat paradox” may certainly be one of the reasons, it 
is difficult to estimate its weight. Doing so will require further investigation into the nature of 
people’s moral views about speciesism.  
4. Researching ‘Folk Speciesism’: Six Caveats 
The question of the extent to which ‘the folk’ endorses speciesism, and of people’s rationales for 
endorsing speciesism, is currently under-researched [7]. Further research on these questions is an 
important direction to advance the speciesism debate. Conducting this research, however, as well as 
interpreting it, is less straightforward than might appear at first. In this section, I highlight six caveats 
and interpretative difficulties that come along with experiments on folk speciesism and provide 
suggestions to foster methodological and conceptual progress. 
First, one should be careful not to overstate the normative significance of research on folk belief. 
What if it turns out that a great majority of people are indeed speciesists? Surely, this does not suffice 
to corroborate speciesism as the correct ethical view. Instead, the most important normative purpose 
for which experimental findings about folk opinion can be put to use is more indirect: it can help to 
evaluate the moral reliability of speciesist intuitions. For instance, suppose that research 
demonstrates that speciesist intuitions are quick and cursory, whereas anti-speciesist intuitions only 
emerge after sustained reflection (cf. [15]). Arguably, this would raise doubts about the moral 
tenability of speciesist intuitions. Or consider Caviola et al.’s [7] argument, which suggests that 
speciesism is psychologically related to specific forms of prejudice. Arguably, this finding 
strengthens the ethical case for anti-speciesism. 
Second, however, a major caveat that complicates assessments of the ethical relevance of extant 
work on this topic is that different authors tend to define speciesism in different ways. This is 
illustrated by the few existing studies that explicitly focus on testing to what extent people endorse 
speciesist intuitions, which operationalize speciesism somewhat differently from each other [2,7], and 
altogether differently from Singer’s [3] definition. 
Third, while folk opinion is often scrutinized by means of survey studies, in such studies the 
subtleties of different ethical positions are easily lost. Consider the following possibility: while prima 
facie it may appear that respondent A is a speciesist, respondent A actually subscribes to the Principle 
of Equal Consideration of Interests but thinks that this principle only rarely applies, since the interests 
of different animals are typically not sufficiently similar (see Section 5 for further discussion). 
Technically, in this case, we should not regard respondent A as a speciesist, at least not in Singer’s 
sense. However, there is reason to think that in experimental studies, this technicality will easily be 
overlooked, since it is also sometimes overlooked in discussions by philosophical experts (see Section 
6). 
Fourth, in survey research, respondents’ immediate responses are typically probed by means of 
a forced choice paradigm (see [16] for discussion). When this method is used, researchers are likely 
to capture people’s first-off intuitions, rather than their tutored intuitions. While for some purposes, 
(e.g., in advancing EDAs) people’s first-off intuitions might be more telling than their tutored 
intuitions, this is not always the case. For instance, when philosophers make a claim from the 
armchair about the contents of folk intuition, they might intend to make a claim about such intuitions 
under idealized conditions—for example, as they would come out in Socratic dialogue. It should be 
kept in mind that such claims cannot be straightforwardly corroborated or debunked on the basis of 
survey-based research.  
Fifth, we should bear in mind that apart from professional ethicists, few people have ever 
explicitly reflected on the relevant ethical principles that play a role in the speciesism debate. This 
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further complicates the question of whether people are normatively committed to speciesism (which 
is distinct from the question of whether people behave as if they are). Given a lack of previous 
familiarity with the relevant ethical principles, research questionnaires might easily give rise to a 
training component, whereby respondents update their ethical views. 
Sixth, we should not assume from the outset that folk opinion will cluster into any clear majority 
position. It is quite possible that opinions on the issue of speciesism radically diverge. Researchers 
should take the latter possibility seriously and not preclude it by presenting their respondents with 
restrictive questionnaires. Ideally, to acquire a balanced view of folk opinion, survey-based studies 
should be complemented with methods of dialogue and reflection [17].  
5. Limitations of Singer’s Anti-Speciesist Position 
In the previous sections, I have argued that Singer’s anti-speciesist position is ethically plausible 
and that although further research is needed, there is preliminary reason to think that his position 
can get further support from EDAs. But in the present section, I will argue that Singer’s Principle of 
Equal Consideration of Interests also faces a challenge, which may serve to limit its scope. Recall that 
according to this principle, we must give equal weight to like interests. As Kagan [1] (p. 5) points out, 
much hinges on the latter qualification—interests should be alike. We might call this the principle’s 
Similarity Condition:  
• Similarity Condition: The interests of the individuals to whom the Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests applies should be sufficiently alike  
The Similarity Condition should be fulfilled for Singer’s principle to be applicable. It might be 
argued, however, that the interests of members of different species are rarely sufficiently alike to 
allow for equal consideration. Instead, animal interests across species are typically qualitatively 
different. If this is correct, then giving unequal consideration to these interests need not amount to a 
speciesist prejudice, sensu Singer. After all, his principle is compatible with the view that if interests 
are sufficiently dissimilar, they need not be given equal consideration. 
To illustrate this, consider how experiences of suffering might differ across species (Appendix 
A, 6). Homo sapiens is a markedly social species, with high levels of parental bonding. As a result, 
human individuals typically suffer immensely from the loss of a child. Also, humans have highly 
developed cognitive capacities, and can, therefore, suffer from cognitively sophisticated emotions, 
such as the emotion of regret. Now consider the green sea turtle, which is a solitary species whose 
members do not invest in parental care, and are unlikely to suffer as a result of cognitively 
sophisticated emotions like regret. As a result, the kinds of suffering that a human and a green sea 
turtle experience may be quite different, and their interests in not-suffering are extremely difficult to 
compare. Obviously, these differences justify differential treatment, which is unproblematic on 
Singer’s account. But more worrisome, the differences also seem to preclude equal consideration of 
interests, since the respective interests are simply too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration 
would amount to (of course, the dissimilarity does not preclude consideration of interests as such). 
Under such conditions, Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests cannot straightforwardly 
be applied. 
Before we can legitimately apply Singer’s principle, then, we first have to examine to what extent 
suffering in different species is similar. Or put in terms of interests: to what extent are their ‘interests 
in not suffering’ sufficiently alike? This is a complicated question. It becomes even more complicated 
when we switch focus from interests regarding not suffering, to interests regarding enjoying life, or 
general evaluations of quality of life [18]. Plausibly, evaluations of quality of life will be rather diverse 
across species, and difficult to compare between them. But this difficulty notwithstanding, people 
seem to be prone to make such comparisons anyway. Experimental results suggest that species-
relative considerations about quality of life play an important role in ordinary moral deliberation [19] 
(p. 58). Moreover, such considerations also figure explicitly in the reasoning of professional 
ethicists—notably in Singer’s own reasoning, when he argues that: 
Animals 2019, 9, 1054 8 of 14 
“pain and suffering are equally bad—and pleasure and happiness equally good—whether the being 
experiencing them is human or non-human, rational or non-rational, capable of discourse or not. On 
the other hand, death is a greater or lesser loss depending on factors like the extent to which the being 
was aware of his or her existence over time, and of course the quality of life the being was likely to 
have, had it continued to live.” [4] (p. 576) 
A plausible interpretation of Singer’s view is as follows: he maintains that interests closely 
associated with a capacity for sentience (such as suffering, pain and pleasure) can be compared fairly 
straightforwardly, but he also grants that in other respects, the interests of different animals may 
differ and that these differences preclude application of the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. 
Indeed, as the quoted passage suggests, Singer even submits that what might prima facie appear to be 
similar interests—such as an interest in not dying—can ultimately turn out to be distinct interests, 
depending on the self-awareness and temporal extension of the animals whose interests they are. 
The upshot of our examination of the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, then, is as 
follows. While this principle is plausible on ethical grounds (Section 2), there is preliminary reason 
to think that it has limited application. It may well turn out that only in a limited number of cases, 
the interests of different animals are sufficiently similar to apply the principle. If the Similarity 
Condition is not met, then as far as the principle goes, we might legitimately give animal interests 
differential concern (Appendix A, 7). As a result, there might be ample contexts in which we can give 
special consideration to the interests of members of our own species—and we can do so without being 
speciesists, in Singer’s sense. 
This analysis also suggests a future research avenue that will be particularly important for the 
speciesism debate. Such research involves both a strong philosophical and a strong empirical 
component. A crucial philosophical task is to normatively evaluate when the interests of different 
animals count as sufficiently similar. A crucial empirical task is to investigate, in detail, the 
experiences of members of different species, such as the experience of suffering. The latter task brings 
along a philosophical challenge as well: apart from behavioural observations, it requires researchers 
to integrate knowledge from different fields and make plausible conjectures about animal 
phenomenology (cf. [20]). Close collaboration between philosophers and empirical scientists is called 
for. 
6. Speciesism versus Species-Relativism: Disentangling Two Debates 
As pointed out in the previous section, Singer’s anti-speciesist position is compatible with the 
view that there are morally relevant differences between the interests of members of different species 
(Appendix A, 8). This point is sometimes lost on contributors to the speciesism debate. For instance, 
as noted in Section 3, François Jacquet ([2] passim) defines “the speciesist belief” as “the belief that 
there is a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals.” (Appendix A, 9) Thus 
defined, however, almost all contemporary ethicists—including Singer—should be classified as 
speciesists. Since such a classification would be bizarre, it seems natural to conclude that Jacquet’s 
definition misses the mark (Appendix A, 10). 
This confusion points to a distinction between two orthogonal debates about the moral relevance 
of species membership, which is sometimes overlooked in the literature: a debate between speciesists 
and anti-speciesists, and a debate between species-relativists and species-egalitarians. The former 
debate is essentially about the question of whether there exists a moral hierarchy between animals of 
different species. Sociological studies [21], as well as experimental findings [19], suggest that people 
tend to give preferential consideration to members of some species over others. Is people’s invocation 
of a ‘sociozoological scale’ morally justifiable? Are some animals indeed more significant from a moral 
point of view than others? Do they rank higher on the moral ladder, and deserve better moral 
treatment? Speciesists answer affirmatively, at least where our own species is concerned: we should 
favour the interests of humans, even when the interests of other species are alike. Anti-speciesists, 
on the other hand, subscribe to the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: if the interests of animals 
are alike, then equal consideration is called for. 
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The other debate is essentially about whether there are morally relevant differences between 
animals of different species. Species-relativists answer affirmatively: there are morally relevant 
differences between members of different species, in virtue of which their interests may justifiably be 
given differential consideration. But differential consideration need not amount to favouritist 
consideration. It is perfectly possible that a species-relativist is also an anti-speciesist, and maintains 
that if interests are alike, they should be given equal consideration. However, as it happens, interests 
are often not alike—and especially where humans are concerned, the differences are morally relevant. 
(Appendix A, 11) This position stands in opposition to a position that has been labelled species-
egalitarianism, according to which all species have equal moral standing and command equal respect 
([22]; see [23] for critical discussion). Species-egalitarians maintain that while animals (as well as 
plants) of different species are dissimilar, these dissimilarities are morally irrelevant: all living beings 
deserve equal moral consideration (Appendix A, 12). 
Species-egalitarianism and anti-speciesism are orthogonal positions; the former entails the latter, 
but the latter does not entail the former. Adherents of both positions endorse the aforementioned 
Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests:  
• Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests: We must give equal weight to like interests  
But species-egalitarians subscribe to an additional principle, which is incompatible with species-
relativism:  
• Principle of No Morally Relevant Differences: There are no morally relevant differences 
between species 
A useful way to distinguish the four abovementioned positions is by making their commitments 
regarding these two moral principles explicit: 
As Table 1 brings out, a commitment to speciesism is more distinctive than a commitment to 
species-relativism, and a commitment to species-egalitarianism is more distinctive than a 
commitment to anti-speciesism. The middle positions are more generic and partly overlap: Singer, 
for instance, is both a species-relativist and an anti-speciesist. 
Table 1. Four distinct positions concerning the moral relevance of species-membership. 
 
Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests 
Principle of No Morally 
Relevant Differences  
Speciesists deny deny 
Anti-Speciesists endorse deny or endorse  
Species-Relativists  deny or endorse deny 
Species-Egalitarianists endorse endorse 
In closing this section, let’s look at a possible way of specifying the position of the species-
relativist in some more detail. As outlined above, species-relativists maintain that there are morally 
relevant differences between members of different species. However, this still leaves open whether 
species-membership is what grounds these differences, or whether the differences are grounded in 
some other property. For instance, what might be morally relevant according to species-relativists is 
not species-membership itself, but certain capacities of animals, which happen to correlate strongly 
with species membership (cf. [24] (p. 184)).  
While this ‘correlational’ version of species-relativism might seem plausible at first glance, it 
may be problematic on closer scrutiny. Suppose we grant the species-relativist that there are morally 
relevant differences between members of different species. There is reason to believe that if there are 
such differences, and if they are not grounded in species-membership, then they also do not strongly 
correlate with species membership. After all, the capacities that are the most obvious candidates for 
justifying differential moral treatment—for example, whether animals belong to a prey or predator 
species, are social or solitary, have high or low investment in parental care, produce a lot or little 
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offspring—are shared by a vast number of species. Hence, biological species-membership seems 
much too narrow as a category to strongly correlate with morally relevant properties. Consider, for 
example, that on biological classifications, the ‘Sumatran orangutan’ and the recently discovered 
‘Tapanuli orangutan’ should be regarded as different species [25], whereas there are barely any 
perceivable differences between them—certainly no differences that anyone would regard as morally 
relevant. The differentiation between these species is made predominantly on the basis of genetics. 
By contrast, properties that species-relativists are likely to regard as morally relevant are behavioural 
traits and mental capacities, or perhaps relational traits such as phylogenetic proximity to our own 
species [21] (Appendix A, 13). 
It may, of course, be the case that because of some historical happenstance (e.g., because our 
closest sister-species have gone extinct), Homo sapiens is somewhat atypical in this regard, and that 
humans possess a set of morally relevant features that does uniquely correlate with species 
membership. However, this is not obviously true, as suggested by the fact that several of the 
capacities that have been hailed as being characteristic of ‘persons’, such as self-awareness, 
psychological unity, and temporal continuity, might be shared by several species (e.g., [26]) 
(Appendix A, 14). Nevertheless, in the next and final section, I will argue that the correlational version 
of species-relativism still holds some promise. Homo sapiens may indeed be atypical: arguably, as a 
contingent matter of fact, there are certain morally relevant features about the lives of human beings, 
which are largely absent from the lives of non-human animals. 
7. The Case for Human Exceptionalism: Dead, Loose, and Open Ends 
Thus far, in discussing speciesism, we have specifically looked at views that privilege the 
interests of certain animals on the basis of their individual characteristics. This is commonplace in 
animal ethics: many authors—including Singer—subscribe to the view of ‘moral individualism’, 
according to which the particular characteristics of individuals, rather than group membership, 
should be the determinant of our moral consideration. [24] (p. 173) 
But even if commonplace, it is not obvious that this view is correct. Detractors might argue that 
group membership can also be regarded as a morally relevant property. Consider the fact that 
conservationists commonly ascribe a specific normative status to a given population of animals (e.g., 
‘to be protected’). This status, in turn, has normative implications for the way that individuals who 
are members of this population ought to be treated. Naturally, it could be questioned whether the 
practice of granting different conservation statuses to different groups of animals is appropriate: the 
fact that we engage in this practice does not imply that the practice is justified. But the fact that this 
practice is commonplace and fairly uncontroversial provides preliminary reason to think that appeals 
to the moral significance of group membership are at least sometimes justified. 
In this section, I first discuss a way of advancing a ‘non-individualist’ speciesist view in more 
detail by considering an argument put forward by Bernard Williams. I argue that his speciesist view 
is either a dead end or insufficiently developed: Williams ultimately insists on the moral relevance of 
group-membership (more specifically, on the relevance of “being a human”), rather than justifying it. 
But I go on to propose that a slightly different argument, which blurs the boundaries of ‘moral 
individualism’ and ‘non-individualism’, holds more promise: arguably, the corollaries of collective 
human behaviour are significant for appreciating the morally relevant features of individual human 
lives.  
First, consider Williams’ [6] view. According to Williams, ethics is an unavoidably human 
project, and our ethical concepts are shaped accordingly. (Appendix A, 15) Williams illustrates this 
by presenting the thought-experiment of an invasion by intelligent but disgusting aliens, who 
threaten to take over our planet and exterminate our species. In response, he imagines that humans 
defend their cultural and ethnic identity with appeals to “defend humanity” and “stand up for 
human beings.” He remarks: 
“This is an ethical appeal in an ethical dispute. (…) The relevant ethical concept is something like: 
loyalty to, or identity with, one’s ethnic or cultural grouping. Moreover—and this is the main lesson 
of this fantasy—this is an ethical concept we already have. This is the ethical concept that is at work 
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when, to the puzzlement of the critics, we afford special consideration to human beings because they 
are human beings. (…) So the idea of there being an ethical concept that appeals to our species 
membership is entirely coherent.” [6] (p. 150) 
In this thought-experiment, Williams singles out a concept entrenched in ordinary thought—the 
concept of being loyal to one’s own species. But why should we take this concept to have prescriptive 
ethical force, rather than regarding it as a vestige of outdated wisdom, that ought to be rejected? 
Surely the fact that we have the concept of loyalty to one’s own group does not suffice to establish 
that the concept’s contents are morally desirable. If group-loyalty is just a prejudice, then Williams’ 
position falls straight within the target of Singer’s criticism: given the Principle of Equal Consideration 
of Interests, it should be discarded. 
The weak spot of Williams’ position is that he grants that favouritism towards fellow humans is 
ultimately indeed just a prejudice: we happen to be on the side of humans, rather than any other group 
(see Singer’s [5] criticism). But perhaps, by granting this, Williams concedes too much and overlooks 
the possibility that preferential treatment of members of our own group might be justified by virtue 
of certain features that are unique to our species. Consider the fact that humans are engaged in 
intergenerational projects of knowledge accumulation, which have led to a rich understanding of 
ourselves, our surroundings, and our place in the universe—an understanding that is unquestionably 
much richer than that of any other species we are familiar with (Appendix A, 16). We have knowledge 
of our own origins and history, we have accumulated a cultural legacy that is unprecedented among 
life on our planet, and we have erected—and continue to refine—elaborate institutions in domains 
such as education, healthcare, art, and science, which enable ever more individuals to benefit from 
our collective, intergenerational achievements. Arguably, these and similar achievements make our 
species worth preserving (cf. [27])—perhaps more so than other species. If so, then under conditions 
of pending extinction, as Williams envisions in his thought-experiment, we might be entitled to claim 
a distinct normative status (‘to be protected’) for members of our own species, without this being mere 
prejudice (Appendix A, 17). 
Moreover, arguably, our cumulative cultural achievements have also enriched the lives of all 
human individuals who benefit from them: they make human lives more interesting, diverse, 
surprising, rich and worthwhile than the lives of other animals, or at least potentially so (Appendix 
A, 18). Therefore, at least in most (though not all) cases, there is some prima facie plausibility to the 
claim that the quality of the lives of individual humans, understood as a function of their ‘richness’, 
is quite different from the quality of life of most non-human animals (see also [18] (p. 186)). Of course, 
this claim needs further substantiation: an adequate defence requires a detailed normative account 
of what makes a life rich, as well as intimate acquaintance with the lives of the animals who make up 
the comparison class. Once again, a combination of philosophical and empirical work is called for. 
In closing, let’s return to the speciesism debate. Is the view sketched above, according to which 
the cumulative cultural capacities of our species affect that moral status of human individuals, a 
speciesist view? That depends. One might argue that our cultural heritage has transformed human 
lives in morally relevant ways, and that, as a result, the interests of individual humans are typically 
different from those of other animals, and in many cases too dissimilar to apply the Principle of Equal 
Consideration of Interests. This view would count as ‘species-relativist’, though not necessarily as 
speciesist in Singer’s sense. A genuinely speciesist view contains an additional normative claim: our 
unique cultural capacities elevate the moral status of human individuals, in the sense that they make 
human interests more significant than the like interests of other animals. But note that this additional 
claim does not follow from the suggestion that our cultural achievements have had a transformative 
effect on human lives; further argument is needed, from those who aspire to defend it. 
8. Conclusions 
There are various ways in which the speciesism debate can be moved forward. A recurring 
theme in this article has been the importance of integrating empirical research and philosophical 
analysis. The plausibility of philosophical claims often depends on empirical findings; empirical 
research, in turn, often relies on tacit conceptual and normative assumptions, which merit 
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philosophical scrutiny. One specific issue where a close interplay between philosophical and 
empirical work can advance the debate is in scrutinizing the tenability of speciesist intuitions. 
Ethicists often treat strongly held intuitions as argumentative fixed-points, but the presumptive 
weight of moral intuitions should not be taken for granted. To what extent people indeed have 
speciesist intuitions, and whether such intuitions can be successfully targeted by Evolutionary 
Debunking Arguments, are important questions for future research. 
Integrated philosophical and empirical work will also be important in evaluating the 
applicability of Singer’s Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. I have argued that if animal 
interests are typically dissimilar, Singer’s principle has limited application. To what extent animal 
interests are in fact dissimilar, however, is an open question, which requires further empirical 
research. Additionally, it is a question with a normative component, for it is an ethical question under 
what conditions the interests of different animals count as sufficiently similar to merit equal 
consideration. Especially with regard to the interests of human individuals, and the question to what 
extent these are comparable to the interests of non-human animals, the speciesism debate raises issues 
that are is still far from resolved. 
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Appendix A. Endnotes 
1. The term speciesism was coined in 1970 by Richard D. Ryder, in a privately published pamphlet. Peter 
Singer took the term from Ryder and popularized it in Animal Liberation (1975). 
2. In philosophical parlance, a ‘person’ is roughly a being that is rational, conscious, self-aware and 
temporally extended. The version of personism that Kagan [1] proposes as worthy of “careful further 
investigation” is “modal personism”—the view according to which the metaphysical fact that one could 
have been a person is morally significant. 
3. Singer (1975, p. 6), too, evaluates speciesism as “a prejudice or attitude of bias”, thus intertwining a 
description of speciesism with its evaluation. But as Kagan [1] (p. 2) points out, Singer’s view can be 
restated in descriptive terms. 
4. There are different arguments to this effect (i.e., arguments in defence of speciesism). For instance, some 
ethicists argue that our relationship to fellow human beings is similar to the special relations we have 
towards our family members, and which—on some moral views—can justify preferential moral treatment 
towards them (e.g., Scanlon [28] (p. 185); see McMahan [29] for critical discussion). It is beyond the scope 
of the current article to discuss all defences of speciesism that have been given in the literature. Here and 
in what follows, I primarily focus on the defence of speciesism advanced by Kagan (Sections 2 and 3) and 
by Williams (Section 7). 
5. Additionally, there are also historical reasons to think that the association between speciesism and racist 
prejudice is not without support: the appeals to the biology of present-day speciesists share common 
origins with the biological appeals of 19th and early 20th century racists [30] (p. 42). 
6. The argument that suffering in different species can be qualitatively different is fairly commonplace in the 
animal ethics literature. For instance, McMahan [31] argues that “the greater psychological depth, 
complexity, and unity in most human beings make it possible for them to have lives that contain more, and 
arguably more important, dimensions of the good (such as significant accomplishment, personal relations 
based on deep mutual understanding, and so on) and are therefore more worth living than those of animals. 
In most cases, therefore, the psychological damage caused by suffering is worse in human beings because 
the life that is damaged matters more.” 
7. Of course, it should be kept in mind that this need not be the only ethically relevant principle in the context 
of speciesism. 
8. Kumar [32] (p. 71) highlights roughly the same point: “It does not follow (…) from species membership not 
justifying what some take it to justify that species membership is morally irrelevant.” 
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9. In the article’s abstract “the speciesist belief” is characterized in line with Singer’s formulation, namely as 
the belief “that human interests matter much more than the like interests of non-human animals” [2] (p. 1). 
But in the remainder of the article, Jacquet builds on the alternative definition, cited above. 
10. Another example of a discussion that conflates these debates can be found in Cohen [33] (p. 867). 
11. An example is Nussbaum’s [34] capabilities approach, which proposes a species-specific norm of 
flourishing as a yardstick for evaluating the flourishing of individual animals. 
12. For instance, Taylor [35] (p. 35) argues that “[r]ejecting the notion of human superiority entails its positive 
counterpart: the doctrine of species impartiality. One who accepts that doctrine regards all living things as 
possessing inherent worth—the same inherent worth since no one species has been shown to be either 
higher or lower than any other.” 
13. A further problem for species-relativists is the ‘species problem’ in the philosophy of biology, which 
appears to be unsolvable [36]. Species are difficult to define; on recent counts, between 27 and 92 different 
‘species concepts’ have been proposed, many of which are incompatible. If species cannot be clearly 
defined, then it seems problematic to assert that morally relevant properties strongly correlate with species 
membership. 
14. ‘Species overlap’ regarding capacities that seem to be morally relevant, is one of two considerations that 
drives a key argument against speciesism, the so-called ‘argument from marginal cases’ (the other 
consideration is the fact that some humans lack these capacities). 
15. A somewhat related view—and defence of speciesism—has been advanced by Cora Diamond [37]. 
Diamond argues that the concept of being human is not a biological concept, but rather an “ethical” or 
“imaginative” concept, which deeply influences our ethical thought. An objection that her view faces, 
however, is that she fails to establish why the significant role that the property of “being human” plays in 
ordinary ethical thought, and the fact that its application is restricted to members of our own species, is 
appropriate. As McMahan [29] convincingly argues, when push comes to shove, it is unclear exactly what, 
on Diamond’s view, can be considered as constitutive of “being human”, other than being a member of a 
given biological species. 
16. For elaboration of the importance (and unprecedented scale) of cumulative culture in the evolution of 
Homo sapiens, see [38]. 
17. Note that this distinctive normative status need not be grounded in species-membership. One might argue 
that what matters is the continuation of the projects our species is engaged in, not the continuation of the 
species itself. If a different species were to evolve with a similar—or improved—capacity to continue these 
projects, then there would be no reason to give moral preference to our own species. If Williams’ thought-
experiment is understood along these lines, then a special plea to “defend humanity” does turn out to be 
just a prejudice. 
18. Here the dividing line between ‘moral individualism’ and its ‘non-individualist’ counterpart has been 
blurred: we focus on the distinctive character of the lives of human individuals, but this distinctive 
character is a function of the evolution of human societies. 
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